Why Should We Be Concerned About the China-India Border Conflict
Long-standing
border tensions risk dangerous escalation as rivalry between these nuclear
powers heats up.
The conflict
between Chinese and Indian troops over the two nations' 2,100-mile-long
contentious border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), in December
2022, demonstrates a concerning "one step forward, two steps back"
tendency. This brawl was the bloodiest in the Galwan Valley since 2020, when
violence killed 20 Indian and at least four Chinese soldiers. Although these
skirmishes are frequently followed by talks and other measures to alleviate
tensions, both parties have militarised their border policy and show no signs
of relenting. And the border situation remains tight, with Beijing and New
Delhi reinforcing their postures on either side of the LAC, raising the
prospect of an escalation between the two nuclear-armed countries.
On June 12,
2009, Indian soldiers are spotted in Tawang Valley, Arunachal Pradesh, India. A
skirmish in this border region in December 2022 underlines the hazards of the
escalating Sino-Indian rivalry. (New York Times/Shiho Fukada)
Tensions
over the border are especially concerning considering the broader trend of the
Sino-Indian relationship, which has deteriorated substantially in recent years.
If Beijing and New Delhi are to address their long-standing disagreements, they
will face a number of hurdles, many of which have been increased by the recent
skirmishes. These include border militarization, India's more assertive foreign
policy, and mounting risks to regional strategic stability.
Military Construction Close to the
Border
Following
the Galwan incident, the two sides held 18 rounds of corps-commander level
negotiations, which resulted in a partial retreat of forces and the
establishment of military buffer zones. Indeed, these negotiations aided in
preventing unwelcome escalation – an achievement that should not be forgotten.
However, true disengagement has been little, with large numbers of personnel
stationed near the border. The most recent round of talks produced no
significant breakthroughs.
Despite
successive disengagement agreements since 2020, both sides have strengthened
their relative footholds along the border, bringing in new combined-arms units
and constructing new infrastructure. China, in particular, has prioritised
infrastructure development along the LAC. China's legislature established a
land borders law in 2021, requiring the government to "promote
coordination between border defence and social, economic development in border
areas." China has built considerable civilian and military facilities near
the border in accordance with this mission.
According to
the Pentagon's most recent China military strength report, after the 2020
Galwan skirmish, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has "maintained
continuous force presence and continued infrastructure buildup along The most
recent satellite imagery of the border zones confirms this. CSIS' China Power
images, for example, show a division-level headquarters being built at Pangong
Lake, just south of the Gogra Hot Springs, where troops left last autumn. In
the Galwan Valley, commercial satellite photography shows what look to be
barracks and other new infrastructure. These additional locations indicate a
more permanent Chinese military presence along the border.
In the
meantime, the Indian military has begun its own military buildup around the
border. For example, in 2021, New Delhi redirected around 50,00 troops to the
LAC. The Indian Air Force is also still stationed along the border.
Infrastructure projects, such as plans to build 73 strategic roads along the
LAC, including nearly 1,430 miles of road in the Indian state of Arunachal
Pradesh — where the December 2022 clashes occurred and which Beijing claims as
"Southern Tibet" — as well as several tunnels to facilitate faster
transportation to border regions, are bolstering this force increase. This
year, the Indian government also launched its "Vibrant Villages"
initiative to improve critical infrastructure in villages on their side of the
disputed boundary.
The harsh
reality is that both sides are militarising their respective borders. India has
begun shifting its army away from Pakistan and towards the LAC in response to a
persistent and growing Chinese threat. As a result, both Chinese and Indian
military will have a stronger and more persistent presence in the coming year.
And these developments will only add to the difficulty of resolving these
long-standing disagreements.
India's More Bold Foreign Policy
Overall, New
Delhi's foreign policy has been geared more towards resisting Beijing than
engagement in recent years, and the border dispute has sabotaged increasingly
tense bilateral relations. Indeed, both India's prime minister and foreign
minister have stated that border tranquilly is necessary for normalised ties.
The
Sino-Indian friendship warmed after the Cold War and includes regular
high-level engagement. Both countries agreed on several global problems,
notably the desire to overhaul the multilateral international order, and
bilateral trade increased dramatically. As a result, it was widely assumed in
Indian foreign policy circles that the boundary dispute could be maintained
separate from the political and economic connection, finally creating space to
accommodate each other's interests and stabilise the bilateral relationship.
However,
following the 2020 Galwan crisis, these assumptions have been called into
question. In the economic sector, New Delhi has tightened inspections and
restrictions on Chinese investments and enterprises in response to Beijing's
border breaches. Following the 2020 clash, India also banned dozens of Chinese
apps, including TikTok and WeChat. Since then, more bans have been imposed,
resulting in the exclusion of hundreds of Chinese apps from the enormous Indian
market. Simultaneously, it has prioritised economic interaction with other
countries in order to minimise its reliance on China, such as recent free trade
discussions with the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as the
Resilient Supply Chain Initiative with Japan and Australia.
These shifts
in India's economic engagement with China have been bolstered by the country's
growing strategic alliance with Western democracies. For example, defence trade
between the United States and India has increased from "near zero in 2008
to over 20 billion USD in 2020." Washington and New Delhi recently created
the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies to strengthen their
strategic technology relationship and industrial defence cooperation. The two military
have also formalised a number of exercises, including Tiger Triumph, Yudh
Abhyas, and Malabar, which now bring together the fleets of Australia, India,
Japan, and the United States, known as the Quad.
As New
Delhi's stance towards Beijing has toughened, it has strengthened ties with the
US and other Indo-Pacific countries. This also comes at a time when India and
China are facing increasing economic challenges and mutual mistrust.
Inevitably, New Delhi's new foreign policy approach will clash with Chinese
interests, creating new issues for border management in 2023.
Strategic Uncertainty in Asia?
Strategic
stability in Asia is becoming more difficult to manage amid tensions between
China and India, political and economic turbulence in Pakistan, and the
resumption of great power competition. The area is seeing a security cascade in
which nuclear-armed powers – China, India, and Pakistan – rationalise
improvements in their own arsenals as a response to perceived threats from
their enemies. This quandary raises the possibility that border disputes will
escalate to nuclear levels.
Chinese
President Xi Jinping stated during the 20th National Party Congress last autumn
that his country needed to establish a powerful "strategic deterrence
system." Xi's words reflect Beijing's growing dissatisfaction with the
international climate. This new threat perception, combined with Beijing's
growing nuclear arsenal and investments in advanced delivery systems, might
fuel New Delhi's own nuclear buildup. It will, at the very least, exacerbate
the already high levels of mutual distrust.
While
nuclear use seems unlikely, border tensions heighten this risky situation.
Infrastructure development and military patrols along the LAC may spur
increased conventional and nuclear military investments. As a result, these
investments are likely to exacerbate border tensions.
Is There a Role for the United
States?
Clashes
along the LAC have become all too common in recent years, and current trends in
the Sino-Indian relationship indicate little chance for improvement. Both sides
appear to be digging in along the border rather than disengaging, with New
Delhi's foreign policy evolving to become more forceful in criticising Beijing,
while Beijing has become increasingly obstinate. Despite these tensions,
Washington has possibilities to assist decrease the temperature along the
Sino-Indian border.
First, while
Washington can and should express its support for New Delhi, it must do so in a
fashion that does not aggravate an already volatile situation. A well-balanced
reaction will involve opposing unilateral actions by either party to disrupt
the territorial status quo, as well as supporting India's own de-escalation
measures. This consistent and confident assistance, particularly during a crisis,
will help to develop trust and credibility in the US-India cooperation.
Second, the
US may offer important intelligence and information concerning Chinese
movements in border regions, as well as technology to enhance India's own
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. During the
December 2022 border clash in Arunachal Pradesh, the US supplied such
assistance to India. The intelligence enabled India to better prepare for
Chinese intrusions. The lessons learned from this episode can serve as a
foundation for future collaboration. Joint intelligence reviews, in which
analysts from both countries analyse the PLA's activities and intentions near
the border, can also help to strengthen material commitments. Such a move by
Washington would be proactive and unwavering in its support for New Delhi's
situation, without fanning the fires of violence or confusing the matter with
continuing tensions in its own country.
Unfortunately,
the contested border will most likely be defined by business as usual in 2023.
The structural difficulties to China-India relations are unlikely to go away
anytime soon, leaving room for future confrontations. Military negotiations
between Beijing and New Delhi are almost expected to continue — and may very
well prevent unnecessary escalation — but they are unlikely to result in
large-scale withdrawal agreements. If an event escalates into a crisis, a huge
number of neighbouring forces could be drawn into the fight. Such a disastrous
potential should not be overlooked.
Comments
Post a Comment