Iran is preparing to swiftly increase oil production if US sanctions are lifted.

 Why Should We Be Concerned About the China-India Border Conflict

Long-standing border tensions risk dangerous escalation as rivalry between these nuclear powers heats up.

The conflict between Chinese and Indian troops over the two nations' 2,100-mile-long contentious border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), in December 2022, demonstrates a concerning "one step forward, two steps back" tendency. This brawl was the bloodiest in the Galwan Valley since 2020, when violence killed 20 Indian and at least four Chinese soldiers. Although these skirmishes are frequently followed by talks and other measures to alleviate tensions, both parties have militarised their border policy and show no signs of relenting. And the border situation remains tight, with Beijing and New Delhi reinforcing their postures on either side of the LAC, raising the prospect of an escalation between the two nuclear-armed countries.

On June 12, 2009, Indian soldiers are spotted in Tawang Valley, Arunachal Pradesh, India. A skirmish in this border region in December 2022 underlines the hazards of the escalating Sino-Indian rivalry. (New York Times/Shiho Fukada)

Tensions over the border are especially concerning considering the broader trend of the Sino-Indian relationship, which has deteriorated substantially in recent years. If Beijing and New Delhi are to address their long-standing disagreements, they will face a number of hurdles, many of which have been increased by the recent skirmishes. These include border militarization, India's more assertive foreign policy, and mounting risks to regional strategic stability. 

Military Construction Close to the Border

Following the Galwan incident, the two sides held 18 rounds of corps-commander level negotiations, which resulted in a partial retreat of forces and the establishment of military buffer zones. Indeed, these negotiations aided in preventing unwelcome escalation – an achievement that should not be forgotten. However, true disengagement has been little, with large numbers of personnel stationed near the border. The most recent round of talks produced no significant breakthroughs.

Despite successive disengagement agreements since 2020, both sides have strengthened their relative footholds along the border, bringing in new combined-arms units and constructing new infrastructure. China, in particular, has prioritised infrastructure development along the LAC. China's legislature established a land borders law in 2021, requiring the government to "promote coordination between border defence and social, economic development in border areas." China has built considerable civilian and military facilities near the border in accordance with this mission.

According to the Pentagon's most recent China military strength report, after the 2020 Galwan skirmish, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has "maintained continuous force presence and continued infrastructure buildup along The most recent satellite imagery of the border zones confirms this. CSIS' China Power images, for example, show a division-level headquarters being built at Pangong Lake, just south of the Gogra Hot Springs, where troops left last autumn. In the Galwan Valley, commercial satellite photography shows what look to be barracks and other new infrastructure. These additional locations indicate a more permanent Chinese military presence along the border.

In the meantime, the Indian military has begun its own military buildup around the border. For example, in 2021, New Delhi redirected around 50,00 troops to the LAC. The Indian Air Force is also still stationed along the border. Infrastructure projects, such as plans to build 73 strategic roads along the LAC, including nearly 1,430 miles of road in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh — where the December 2022 clashes occurred and which Beijing claims as "Southern Tibet" — as well as several tunnels to facilitate faster transportation to border regions, are bolstering this force increase. This year, the Indian government also launched its "Vibrant Villages" initiative to improve critical infrastructure in villages on their side of the disputed boundary.

The harsh reality is that both sides are militarising their respective borders. India has begun shifting its army away from Pakistan and towards the LAC in response to a persistent and growing Chinese threat. As a result, both Chinese and Indian military will have a stronger and more persistent presence in the coming year. And these developments will only add to the difficulty of resolving these long-standing disagreements.

India's More Bold Foreign Policy

Overall, New Delhi's foreign policy has been geared more towards resisting Beijing than engagement in recent years, and the border dispute has sabotaged increasingly tense bilateral relations. Indeed, both India's prime minister and foreign minister have stated that border tranquilly is necessary for normalised ties.

 

The Sino-Indian friendship warmed after the Cold War and includes regular high-level engagement. Both countries agreed on several global problems, notably the desire to overhaul the multilateral international order, and bilateral trade increased dramatically. As a result, it was widely assumed in Indian foreign policy circles that the boundary dispute could be maintained separate from the political and economic connection, finally creating space to accommodate each other's interests and stabilise the bilateral relationship.

However, following the 2020 Galwan crisis, these assumptions have been called into question. In the economic sector, New Delhi has tightened inspections and restrictions on Chinese investments and enterprises in response to Beijing's border breaches. Following the 2020 clash, India also banned dozens of Chinese apps, including TikTok and WeChat. Since then, more bans have been imposed, resulting in the exclusion of hundreds of Chinese apps from the enormous Indian market. Simultaneously, it has prioritised economic interaction with other countries in order to minimise its reliance on China, such as recent free trade discussions with the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as the Resilient Supply Chain Initiative with Japan and Australia.

These shifts in India's economic engagement with China have been bolstered by the country's growing strategic alliance with Western democracies. For example, defence trade between the United States and India has increased from "near zero in 2008 to over 20 billion USD in 2020." Washington and New Delhi recently created the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies to strengthen their strategic technology relationship and industrial defence cooperation. The two military have also formalised a number of exercises, including Tiger Triumph, Yudh Abhyas, and Malabar, which now bring together the fleets of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, known as the Quad.

As New Delhi's stance towards Beijing has toughened, it has strengthened ties with the US and other Indo-Pacific countries. This also comes at a time when India and China are facing increasing economic challenges and mutual mistrust. Inevitably, New Delhi's new foreign policy approach will clash with Chinese interests, creating new issues for border management in 2023.

Strategic Uncertainty in Asia?

Strategic stability in Asia is becoming more difficult to manage amid tensions between China and India, political and economic turbulence in Pakistan, and the resumption of great power competition. The area is seeing a security cascade in which nuclear-armed powers – China, India, and Pakistan – rationalise improvements in their own arsenals as a response to perceived threats from their enemies. This quandary raises the possibility that border disputes will escalate to nuclear levels.

Chinese President Xi Jinping stated during the 20th National Party Congress last autumn that his country needed to establish a powerful "strategic deterrence system." Xi's words reflect Beijing's growing dissatisfaction with the international climate. This new threat perception, combined with Beijing's growing nuclear arsenal and investments in advanced delivery systems, might fuel New Delhi's own nuclear buildup. It will, at the very least, exacerbate the already high levels of mutual distrust.

While nuclear use seems unlikely, border tensions heighten this risky situation. Infrastructure development and military patrols along the LAC may spur increased conventional and nuclear military investments. As a result, these investments are likely to exacerbate border tensions.

Is There a Role for the United States?

Clashes along the LAC have become all too common in recent years, and current trends in the Sino-Indian relationship indicate little chance for improvement. Both sides appear to be digging in along the border rather than disengaging, with New Delhi's foreign policy evolving to become more forceful in criticising Beijing, while Beijing has become increasingly obstinate. Despite these tensions, Washington has possibilities to assist decrease the temperature along the Sino-Indian border.

 

First, while Washington can and should express its support for New Delhi, it must do so in a fashion that does not aggravate an already volatile situation. A well-balanced reaction will involve opposing unilateral actions by either party to disrupt the territorial status quo, as well as supporting India's own de-escalation measures. This consistent and confident assistance, particularly during a crisis, will help to develop trust and credibility in the US-India cooperation.

 

Second, the US may offer important intelligence and information concerning Chinese movements in border regions, as well as technology to enhance India's own intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. During the December 2022 border clash in Arunachal Pradesh, the US supplied such assistance to India. The intelligence enabled India to better prepare for Chinese intrusions. The lessons learned from this episode can serve as a foundation for future collaboration. Joint intelligence reviews, in which analysts from both countries analyse the PLA's activities and intentions near the border, can also help to strengthen material commitments. Such a move by Washington would be proactive and unwavering in its support for New Delhi's situation, without fanning the fires of violence or confusing the matter with continuing tensions in its own country.

Unfortunately, the contested border will most likely be defined by business as usual in 2023. The structural difficulties to China-India relations are unlikely to go away anytime soon, leaving room for future confrontations. Military negotiations between Beijing and New Delhi are almost expected to continue — and may very well prevent unnecessary escalation — but they are unlikely to result in large-scale withdrawal agreements. If an event escalates into a crisis, a huge number of neighbouring forces could be drawn into the fight. Such a disastrous potential should not be overlooked.