Envyalters individual behavior and, consequently, strategies of a person in
characteristic ways. Due to changed behavior, two separate social classes
arise. Differences in cement class history and education are widely known. It
is not clear when and under what circumstances individual psychological forces
will separate and separate an initially homogeneous social group. Claudius
Gros, professor of theoretical physics at the University of Goethe,
investigated this issue mathematically precisely using game theory methods which
means that everyone optimizes their success by predetermined rules.
I wanted to find out if social differences can emerge alone
if no one starts with advantages – that is, if all actors have the same skills
and opportunities, "explains the physicist.
The study is based on the assumption that things are coveted
but limited in every society, such as jobs, social contacts, and power positions.
If the top position is already occupied, an inequality is created and somebody
must accept the second-best job, but not a social division. Using mathematical
calculations, Gros was able to demonstrate that envy arising from the need to
compare with others alters individual behavior and, consequently, the
strategies of agents in characteristic ways. This changed behavior produces two
strictly separate social classes.
Game theory provides many participants with the mathematical
resources required to model decision situations, as in Gros' analysis. In
general, constellations where each actor's decision strategies influence each
other are particularly revealing. The individual's success then depends not
only on his or her own actions, but also on the actions of others, typical of
economic and social contexts.
Game theory is deeply rooted in the economy.
Game theory's stability condition, the "Nash
equilibrium" is a term developed by John Forbes Nash in his 1950
dissertation, using the example of poker players. It states that no player has
anything to gain by changing their strategy if the other players do not change
theirs either. An individual tries new behavior patterns only if there is
potential gain. Because this causal chain often relates to evolutionary
processes, evolutionary and behavioral sciences often rely on game-theoretical
models, e.g. when studying animal behaviors such as bird migratory flight
routes or their nesting site rivalry.
Also in an envy-induced class society, Gros says, there's no
motivation for a person to change their strategy. So it's Nash stable. In the
divided envy society, there is a marked income difference between the upper and
lower class that is the same for all members of each social class. According to
Gros, it is typical for the members of the lower class to spend their time on a
series of different activities.
However, upper-class members focus on one task, i.e. pursue
a "pure strategy." It is also striking that the upper class can
choose between different options while the lower class has only one mixed
strategy. And the upper class is individualistic, while the crowd loses agents
in the lower class, the physicist sums up.
Whether an agent lands in the upper or lower class is
essentially a mistake in Claudius Gros' model. It's decided by competition
dynamics, not origin. Gros developed a new theoretical model for his study, the
"
shopping trouble model," and developed a precise analytical
solution. He derives from it that an envy-induced class society possesses features
deemed universal in complex system theory. As a result, class society is to
some extent beyond political control.
Political decision-makers lose much of their power when
society unexpectedly divides into social groups. Furthermore, Gros' model shows
that envy has a stronger effect when competition for limited resources is
stronger. "This theoretical game insight could be central. Even a 'ideal
society' can not be sustained stably in the long-term, which ultimately makes
the striving for a communist society seem unrealistic, "the scientist
remarks.
Final words
Envy, the inclination to compare rewards, can be expected to
unfold when pay-off disparities are generated in competitive societies. It is
shown that increasing envy levels inevitably lead to self-induced separation
into lower and upper classes. Class stratification is Nash stable and strict,
with class members receiving identical rewards. Upper-class agents just play
single tactics, all lower-class agents the same mixed strategy. The fraction of
upper-class agents gradually decreases with greater envy levels until a single
upper-class agent remains.
Numerical simulations and a complete analysis of a basic
reference model, the shopping trouble model, are presented. Class-stratified
society's properties are universal and only indirectly controllable through the
underlying utility function, implying that class-stratified societies are
intrinsically resistant to political control. Implications are discussed for
human communities. Envy effects are intensified as cultures become more
competitive.
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